UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993
FACTS:
• Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. She’s married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco.
• Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager.
• Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradford’s instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards.
• Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting.
• Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken.
• Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k.
• May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.
• July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC.
• July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford’s act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority.
• RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision.
• Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction - YES
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction.
2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford’s motion to dismiss. - NO
Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC.
3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO
Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. It’s a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.
Saturday, December 26, 2009
Shauf v. CA 191 SCRA 713
SHAUF vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of CA
FACTS:
• 1990: Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experience and being a qualified dependent locally available.
• By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex (female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth).
• Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
• Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
• RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
• Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
• Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government w/c would require consent.
• Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces
HELD:
Respondents ordered, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100K as moral damages, P20K for atty’s fees.
RATIO:
No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts or the acts of its agents in the Phils. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying petitioner Shauf.
While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law & injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or violates the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit will not be a suit against the state. (Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen) The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted an interview. The person appointed was not even qualified for that position and that person kept the position despite orders from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension of Abalateo’s services is another proof. She was not appointed even if US officials found her highly qualified for the position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service Commission, Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of Air Force). Shauf has proven that discrimination did occur whereas respondents merely denied allegations.
The US Constitution assures everyone of equality in employment & work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed. The Philippine Constitution has a similar provision. Persi & Detwiler violated Shauf’s constitutional right to earn a living, an integral aspect of her right to life. Thus, they should be accountable. Though Shauf is entitled to damages, she should not be paid for the supposedly unearned income had she been hired as a Guidance Counselor. She never acquired rights over that amount because she was never appointed.
Shauf followed the proper procedure in seeking relief for the defendants’ discriminatory acts. The Department of Air Force in Washington told her that one of her appeal rights would be to file a civil action if a final decision has not been rendered after 180 days from the dated of the initial appeal to the Commission. The appeal was lodged on Sept. 30, 1978 and it has not been decided up to the time SC has decided. Shauf is entitled to choose the remedy, not otherwise prohibited, which will best advance & protect her interests.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of CA
FACTS:
• 1990: Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experience and being a qualified dependent locally available.
• By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex (female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth).
• Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
• Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
• RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
• Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
• Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government w/c would require consent.
• Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces
HELD:
Respondents ordered, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100K as moral damages, P20K for atty’s fees.
RATIO:
No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts or the acts of its agents in the Phils. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying petitioner Shauf.
While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law & injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or violates the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit will not be a suit against the state. (Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen) The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted an interview. The person appointed was not even qualified for that position and that person kept the position despite orders from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension of Abalateo’s services is another proof. She was not appointed even if US officials found her highly qualified for the position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service Commission, Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of Air Force). Shauf has proven that discrimination did occur whereas respondents merely denied allegations.
The US Constitution assures everyone of equality in employment & work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed. The Philippine Constitution has a similar provision. Persi & Detwiler violated Shauf’s constitutional right to earn a living, an integral aspect of her right to life. Thus, they should be accountable. Though Shauf is entitled to damages, she should not be paid for the supposedly unearned income had she been hired as a Guidance Counselor. She never acquired rights over that amount because she was never appointed.
Shauf followed the proper procedure in seeking relief for the defendants’ discriminatory acts. The Department of Air Force in Washington told her that one of her appeal rights would be to file a civil action if a final decision has not been rendered after 180 days from the dated of the initial appeal to the Commission. The appeal was lodged on Sept. 30, 1978 and it has not been decided up to the time SC has decided. Shauf is entitled to choose the remedy, not otherwise prohibited, which will best advance & protect her interests.
Raquiza v. Bradford 75 Phil 50
Nature: Original action in the SC. Habeas corpus.
Facts:
By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur, petitioners were arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under security commitment order No 385. The petitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were charged with Espionage activity with the Japanese & active collaboration with the enemy respectively. Power of Commander of the US Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not questioned. He based proclamation on reasons that apprehended have violated due allegiance to US and it is a military necessity. Petitioners move for writ of Habeas Corpus.
Issues:
1. WON the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation?
[Note: The power of commander in chief of the US Army to issue a proclamation providing for military measures to be taken upon the apprehension of Filipino citizens who voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy, cannot be seriously questioned.]
No. “The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at the same time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political dept, & not the judicial dept, to determine if war has ended. Fact that delivery of certain persons under custody of the US Army has already begun doesn’t mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already terminated, w/c clearly it hasn’t. Delivery w/in power of military authorities to make even before was terminated.
2. WON this court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they have been and are being subjected?
No. Civil Courts shouldn’t interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil & criminal jurisdiction of the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our country’s faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.
Facts:
By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur, petitioners were arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under security commitment order No 385. The petitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were charged with Espionage activity with the Japanese & active collaboration with the enemy respectively. Power of Commander of the US Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not questioned. He based proclamation on reasons that apprehended have violated due allegiance to US and it is a military necessity. Petitioners move for writ of Habeas Corpus.
Issues:
1. WON the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation?
[Note: The power of commander in chief of the US Army to issue a proclamation providing for military measures to be taken upon the apprehension of Filipino citizens who voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy, cannot be seriously questioned.]
No. “The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at the same time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political dept, & not the judicial dept, to determine if war has ended. Fact that delivery of certain persons under custody of the US Army has already begun doesn’t mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already terminated, w/c clearly it hasn’t. Delivery w/in power of military authorities to make even before was terminated.
2. WON this court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they have been and are being subjected?
No. Civil Courts shouldn’t interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil & criminal jurisdiction of the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our country’s faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Prov. of North Cotabato v. GRP GR No. 183591
Facts:
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.
Issue:
When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court?
Held:
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.
source:
http://gideonpena.blogspot.com/2009/10/province-of-north-cotabato-et-al-vs-grp.html
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.
Issue:
When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court?
Held:
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.
source:
http://gideonpena.blogspot.com/2009/10/province-of-north-cotabato-et-al-vs-grp.html
Monday, December 14, 2009
World Health Organization v. Aquino 48 SCRA 243
Facts:
Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable goods under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued a search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers for the search and seizure of the personla effects of Dr. Verstuyft notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive branch of the government.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.
Issue:
Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
Ruling:
The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.
source: Dr. Carlos Legislador
In Re: Garcia 2 SCRA 985
Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
Issue:
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar.
Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
source: Dr. Carlos Legislador
Sunday, December 13, 2009
Sanders v. Veridiano GR L-46930 (June10, 1988)
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.
However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear."
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?
RULING:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
17
Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/19098294/Sanders-vs-Veridiano-Case-Digest
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.
However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear."
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?
RULING:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
17
Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/19098294/Sanders-vs-Veridiano-Case-Digest
J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983
Facts :
Petitioner, retired Justice JB .L Reyes filed a petition to respondent, Mayor Ramon Bagatsing, the city mayor of manila that on behalf of anti-bases coalition sought a permit from the city of manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on october 26, 1983 from 2.00 to 5.00 in the afternoon, starting from the luneta, a public park, to the gates of united states embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of the public property, a short program would be held.
On october 20, 1983 the petitioner filed a suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction because due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On october 25, 1983, the answer of respondent mayor was filed on his behalf by assistant solicitor general eduardo g. montenegro. It turned out that on october 19, suc permit was denied.
Issues :
1. Whether or not holding a rally in front of the US embassy would be applicable or a violation of Ordinance no.7295 of the city of manila.
2. Whether or not the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly was justified by clear and present danger.
Ruling :
The petition was granted. The Supreme Court granted the mandatory injunction allowing the proposed march and rally. The court found that there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly.
Our country is signatory of the Vienna Convention. It is binding in our laws. The second paragraph of its Article 22 that the receiving state is under a special duty to take appropriate steps tp protect the premise of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the embassy.
source: http://ralphcajes.blogspot.com/2008/06/jbl-reyes-vs-bagatsing.html
Petitioner, retired Justice JB .L Reyes filed a petition to respondent, Mayor Ramon Bagatsing, the city mayor of manila that on behalf of anti-bases coalition sought a permit from the city of manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on october 26, 1983 from 2.00 to 5.00 in the afternoon, starting from the luneta, a public park, to the gates of united states embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of the public property, a short program would be held.
On october 20, 1983 the petitioner filed a suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction because due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On october 25, 1983, the answer of respondent mayor was filed on his behalf by assistant solicitor general eduardo g. montenegro. It turned out that on october 19, suc permit was denied.
Issues :
1. Whether or not holding a rally in front of the US embassy would be applicable or a violation of Ordinance no.7295 of the city of manila.
2. Whether or not the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly was justified by clear and present danger.
Ruling :
The petition was granted. The Supreme Court granted the mandatory injunction allowing the proposed march and rally. The court found that there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly.
Our country is signatory of the Vienna Convention. It is binding in our laws. The second paragraph of its Article 22 that the receiving state is under a special duty to take appropriate steps tp protect the premise of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the embassy.
source: http://ralphcajes.blogspot.com/2008/06/jbl-reyes-vs-bagatsing.html
Agustin vs. Edu 88 SCRA 195 (1979)
Facts:
The petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen bettle car, model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning devise in case of emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No.229, as amended as well as the Land Transportation Commission.
Respondent Land Transportation Commissioner Romeo Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32 pursuant to Letter of Instruction NO. 229 as amended. It required the use of Early Warning Devices on motor vehicles.
Issue:
Whether or not the Letter of Instructions as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and constitutional.
Ruling:
The court held that the letter of instructions No. 229 as amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid police power measure.
The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction. Whereas the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nation ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety sign and devices. It cannot be disputed then that this declaration of principle found in the constitution possesses relevance because our country adopts the generally accepted principle, thus become part of the law of the land.
The petition was dismissed.
source: http://ralphcajes.blogspot.com/2008/06/agustin-vs-edu.html
The petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen bettle car, model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning devise in case of emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No.229, as amended as well as the Land Transportation Commission.
Respondent Land Transportation Commissioner Romeo Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32 pursuant to Letter of Instruction NO. 229 as amended. It required the use of Early Warning Devices on motor vehicles.
Issue:
Whether or not the Letter of Instructions as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and constitutional.
Ruling:
The court held that the letter of instructions No. 229 as amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid police power measure.
The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction. Whereas the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nation ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety sign and devices. It cannot be disputed then that this declaration of principle found in the constitution possesses relevance because our country adopts the generally accepted principle, thus become part of the law of the land.
The petition was dismissed.
source: http://ralphcajes.blogspot.com/2008/06/agustin-vs-edu.html
Mejoff vs Director of Prisons 90 Phil 70 (1951)
Facts:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a decision of this Court on July 30, 1949. "The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Thereafter, the People's Court ordered his release. But the Deportation Board taking his case up found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was an illegal alien in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After the corresponding investigation, the Immigration Board of Commissioners declared on April 5, 1948 that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designated port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In October 1948, after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements for his departure are being made. Two years having elapsed since the aforesaid decision was promulgated, the Government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although, it should be said in fairness to the deportation authorities that it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Boris Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation.
Ruling:
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Moreover, Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution of the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation." And in a resolution entitled, "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights," and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "all human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2); that "every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9 ); etc. Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: that the petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. No costs will be charged.
source: http://rabbit-icecold.blogspot.com/
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a decision of this Court on July 30, 1949. "The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Thereafter, the People's Court ordered his release. But the Deportation Board taking his case up found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was an illegal alien in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After the corresponding investigation, the Immigration Board of Commissioners declared on April 5, 1948 that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designated port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In October 1948, after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements for his departure are being made. Two years having elapsed since the aforesaid decision was promulgated, the Government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although, it should be said in fairness to the deportation authorities that it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Boris Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation.
Ruling:
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Moreover, Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution of the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation." And in a resolution entitled, "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights," and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "all human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2); that "every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9 ); etc. Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: that the petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. No costs will be charged.
source: http://rabbit-icecold.blogspot.com/
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Kuroda v. Jalandoni 83 Phil 171 (1949)
Facts
Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague Convention’s Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issue
1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional
2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case
3.Whether or not Atty. Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port is allowed to practice law profession in the philippines.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” The generally accepted principles of international law includes those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution.
The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.
On the 3rd issue, the court ruled that the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the U.S. which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. The lest that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow this representation in said trial.
Source: http://pil-rizalyn.blogspot.com/2008/06/kuroda-vs-jalandoni-83-phil-171.html
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113 Nov. 16, 1945
Facts of the case:
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
Issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION:
Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)
digest copied from: http://danabatnag.wordpress.com/2008/12/04/co-kim-chan-v-valdez-tan-keh/
whitney v. robertson 124 U.S. 190 (1888)
Facts:
Merchants were importing sugar from San Domingo, and when they arrived at the custom house in NY, they claimed b/c of the treaty btwn US & San Domingo, that the goods should be admitted duty free. The collector at the port refused, and the merchants were made to pay $21,936 in duties. Merchants then brought this claim to get back the duties paid. Merchants (P) argued that the treaty btwn US and San Domingo promised to provide most favored nation treatment to imports from San Domingo. The most favored nation treatment was from a treaty btwn US and the Hawaiian Islands, where certain goods, including sugar, were exempt from dutycollection. Collector of the port (D) argued that he treated the goods as dutiable articles under the acts of Congress.
Issue:
Whether a treaty supersedes conflicting acts of Congress. -Not necessarily, both are binding.
Holding: Affirmed for D.
Reasoning: Both self-executing treaties and acts of Congress are considered supreme laws of the land, and both should have effect. Justice Fields says that when they conflict with each other, "the one last in date will control the other." Since the acts of Congress were dated last, they control. He also says that if the country with which the treaty is made is dissatisfied with the action of the US legislative dept, then they may present a complaint to the executive had of the govt. RULE: In the case of a conflict btwn a federal statute and a treaty, the one last in date will control.
Notes • Hierarchy - last in time rule • Here the act of congress has trumped an earlier treaty • Dualism again ○ Domestically, we care about checks and balances, that treaty no longer has any effect ○ But in international realm, this is a problem, b/c we are not honoring the treaty with Dominican Republic § Breaching treaty - can be taken to ICJ, etc. § Example of dualist - domestic vs. international obligations
Merchants were importing sugar from San Domingo, and when they arrived at the custom house in NY, they claimed b/c of the treaty btwn US & San Domingo, that the goods should be admitted duty free. The collector at the port refused, and the merchants were made to pay $21,936 in duties. Merchants then brought this claim to get back the duties paid. Merchants (P) argued that the treaty btwn US and San Domingo promised to provide most favored nation treatment to imports from San Domingo. The most favored nation treatment was from a treaty btwn US and the Hawaiian Islands, where certain goods, including sugar, were exempt from dutycollection. Collector of the port (D) argued that he treated the goods as dutiable articles under the acts of Congress.
Issue:
Whether a treaty supersedes conflicting acts of Congress. -Not necessarily, both are binding.
Holding: Affirmed for D.
Reasoning: Both self-executing treaties and acts of Congress are considered supreme laws of the land, and both should have effect. Justice Fields says that when they conflict with each other, "the one last in date will control the other." Since the acts of Congress were dated last, they control. He also says that if the country with which the treaty is made is dissatisfied with the action of the US legislative dept, then they may present a complaint to the executive had of the govt. RULE: In the case of a conflict btwn a federal statute and a treaty, the one last in date will control.
Notes • Hierarchy - last in time rule • Here the act of congress has trumped an earlier treaty • Dualism again ○ Domestically, we care about checks and balances, that treaty no longer has any effect ○ But in international realm, this is a problem, b/c we are not honoring the treaty with Dominican Republic § Breaching treaty - can be taken to ICJ, etc. § Example of dualist - domestic vs. international obligations
Head Money Cases Edye v. Robertson 112 U.S. 580 (1884)
Facts:
In 1882 the Congress passed an act providing that a duty of fifty cents should be collected for each and every passenger who was not a citizen of the United States, coming from a foreign port to any port within the United States. Individuals and steamship companies brought suit against the collector of customs at New York, Mr. WH Robertson, for the recovery of the sums of money collected. The act was challenge on the grounds that it violated numerous treaties of the US government with friendly nations.
Issue:
WON the act is void because of the conflict with the treaty.
Ruling:
A treaty is a compact between independent nations, which depends for its enforcement upon the interest and honor of the governments that are parties to a treaty. Treaties that regulate the mutual rights of citizens and subjects of the contracting nations are in the same category as acts of Congress. When these rights are of such a nature as to be enforced by a court of justice, the court resorts to the treaty as it would to a statute. However, a constitution gives a treaty no superiority over an act on congress. In short, so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.
In 1882 the Congress passed an act providing that a duty of fifty cents should be collected for each and every passenger who was not a citizen of the United States, coming from a foreign port to any port within the United States. Individuals and steamship companies brought suit against the collector of customs at New York, Mr. WH Robertson, for the recovery of the sums of money collected. The act was challenge on the grounds that it violated numerous treaties of the US government with friendly nations.
Issue:
WON the act is void because of the conflict with the treaty.
Ruling:
A treaty is a compact between independent nations, which depends for its enforcement upon the interest and honor of the governments that are parties to a treaty. Treaties that regulate the mutual rights of citizens and subjects of the contracting nations are in the same category as acts of Congress. When these rights are of such a nature as to be enforced by a court of justice, the court resorts to the treaty as it would to a statute. However, a constitution gives a treaty no superiority over an act on congress. In short, so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.
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