SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION [322 SCRA 160 (2000)]
Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC
Facts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.
Issues:
1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing
Yes. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents
The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:
a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).
b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent isn’t prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee)
c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?
No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court.
3. WON there’s any conflict between private respondent’s basic due process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty
No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage.
Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him—a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them.
Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our government’s international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction.
Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the evaluation stage.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John Gotamco and Sons 148 SCRA 36 (1987)
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. JOHN GOTAMCO & SONS, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
The World Health Organization is an international organization which has a regional office in Manila. It enjoys privileges and immunities which are defined more specifically in the Host Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and the said Organization on July 22, 1951. Section 11 of that Agreement provides, inter alit; that
"the Organization, its assets, income and other properties shall be: (a) exempt from all direct and indirect taxes. It is understood, however, that the Organization will not claim exemption from taxes which are, in fact, no more than charges for public utility services; . . . "
WHO decided to construct a building to house its own offices in Manila, and entered into a further agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines on November 26, 1957. This agreement contained the following provision (Article III, paragraph 2):
"The Organization may import into the country materials and fixtures required for the construction free from all duties and taxes and agrees not to utilize any portion of the international reserves of the Government. "
Article VIII of the above-mentioned agreement referred to the Host Agreement concluded on July 22, 1951 which granted the Organization exemption from all direct and indirect taxes.
In inviting bids for the construction of the building, the WHO informed the bidders that the building to be constructed belonged to an international organization with diplomatic status and thus exempt from the payment of all fees, licenses, and taxes, and that therefore their bids "must take this into account and should not include items for such taxes, licenses and other payments to Government agencies."
The construction contract was awarded to respondent John Gotamco & Sons, Inc. (Gotamco for short) on February 10, 1958 for the stipulated price of P370,000.00, but when the building was completed the price reached a total of P452,544.00.
Sometime in May 1958, the WHO received an opinion from the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue stating that "as the 3% contractor's tax is an indirect tax on the assets and income of the Organization, the gross receipts derived by contractors from their contracts with the WHO for the construction of its new building, are exempt from tax in accordance with . . . the Host Agreement." Subsequently, however, on June 3, 1958, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue reversed his opinion and stated that "as the 3% contractor's tax is not a direct nor an indirect tax on the WHO, but a tax that is primarily due from the contractor, the same is not covered by. . . the Host Agreement."
On January 2, 1960, the WHO issued a certification stating, inter alia,:
"When the request for bids for the construction of the World Health Organization office building was called for, contractors were informed that there would be no taxes or fees levied upon them for their work in connection with the construction of the building as this will be considered an indirect tax to the Organization caused by the increase of the contractor's bid in order to cover these taxes. This was upheld by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and it can be stated that the contractors submitted their bids in good faith with the exemption in mind.
The undersigned, therefore, certifies that the bid of John Gotamco & Sons, made under the condition stated above, should be exempted from any taxes in connection with the construction of the World Health Organization office building. "
On January 17, 1961, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent a letter of demand to Gotamco demanding payment of P16,970.40, representing the 3% contractor's tax plus surcharges on the gross receipts it received from the WHO in the construction of the latter's building.
Respondent Gotamco appealed the Commissioner's decision to the Court of Tax Appeals, which after trial rendered a decision, in favor of Gotamco and reversed the Commissioner's decision. The Court of Tax Appeal's decision is now before the court for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON respondent John Gotamco & Sons, Inc. should pay the 3% contractor's tax under Section 191 of the National Internal Revenue Code on the gross receipts it realized from the construction of the World Health Organization office building in Manila.
Ratio/Holding: No. Accordingly, finding no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Tax Appeals, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.
First: petitioner questions the entitlement of the WHO to tax exemption, contending that the Host Agreement is null and void, not having been ratified by the Philippine Senate as required by the Constitution.
We find no merit in this contention. While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate under the Constitution, less formal types of international agreements may be entered into by the Chief Executive and become binding without the concurrence of the legislative body. The Host Agreement comes within the latter category; it is a valid and binding international agreement even without the concurrence of the Philippine Senate. The privileges and immunities granted to the WHO under the Host Agreement have been recognized by this Court as legally binding on Philippine authorities.
Second: Petitioner maintains that even assuming that the Host Agreement granting tax exemption to the WHO is valid and enforceable, the 3% contractor's tax assessed on Gotamco is not an "indirect tax" within its purview. Petitioner's position is that the contractor's tax "is in the nature of an excise tax which is a charge imposed upon the performance of an act, the enjoyment of a privilege or the engaging in an occupation . . . It is a tax due primarily and directly on the contractor, not on the owner of the building. Since this tax has no bearing upon the WHO, it cannot be deemed an indirect taxation upon it."
"In context, direct taxes are those that are demanded from the very person who, it is intended or desired, should pay them; while indirect taxes are those that are demanded in the first instance from one person in the expectation and intention that he can shift the burden to someone else. (Pollock vs. Farmers, L & T Co.) The contractor's tax is of course payable by the contractor but in the last analysis it is the owner of the building that shoulders the burden of the tax because the same is shifted by the contractor to the owner as a matter of selfpreservation. Thus, it is an indirect tax. And it is an indirect tax on the WHO because, although it is payable by the petitioner, the latter can shift its burden on the WHO. In the last analysis it is the WHO that will pay the tax indirectly through the contractor and it certainly cannot be said that 'this tax has no bearing upon the World Health Organization.' "
Third: Petitioner claims that under the authority of the Philippine Acetylene Company versus Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al.,3 the 3% contractor's tax falls directly on Gotamco and cannot be shifted to the WHO.
The Court of Tax Appeals, however, held that the said case is not controlling in this case, since the Host Agreement specifically exempts the WHO from "indirect taxes." We agree. The Philippine Acetylene case involved a tax on sales of goods which under the law had to be paid by the manufacturer or producer; the fact that the manufacturer or producer might have added the amount of the tax to the price of the goods did not make the sales tax "a tax on the purchaser." The Court held that the sales tax must be paid by the manufacturer or producer even if the sale is made to tax-exempt entities like the National Power Corporation, an agency of the Philippine Government, and to the Voice of America, an agency of the United States Government.
The Host Agreement, in specifically exempting the WHO from "indirect taxes," contemplates taxes which, although not imposed upon or paid by the Organization directly, form part of the price paid or to be paid by it. This is made clear in Section 12 of the Host Agreement which provides:
"While the Organization will not, as a general rule, in the case of minor purchases, claim exemption from excise duties, and from taxes on the sale of movable and immovable property which form part of the price to be paid, nevertheless, when the Organization is making important purchases for official use of property on which such duties and taxes have been charged or are chargeable the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall make appropriate administrative arrangements for the remission or return of the amount of duty or tax "
Summary of Ratio: The certification issued by the WHO, dated January 20, 1960, sought exemption of the contractor, Gotamco, from any taxes in connection with the construction of the WHO office building. The 3% contractor's tax would be within this category and should be viewed as a form of an "indirect tax" on the Organization, as the payment thereof or its inclusion in the bid price would have meant an increase in the construction cost of the building.
Facts:
The World Health Organization is an international organization which has a regional office in Manila. It enjoys privileges and immunities which are defined more specifically in the Host Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and the said Organization on July 22, 1951. Section 11 of that Agreement provides, inter alit; that
"the Organization, its assets, income and other properties shall be: (a) exempt from all direct and indirect taxes. It is understood, however, that the Organization will not claim exemption from taxes which are, in fact, no more than charges for public utility services; . . . "
WHO decided to construct a building to house its own offices in Manila, and entered into a further agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines on November 26, 1957. This agreement contained the following provision (Article III, paragraph 2):
"The Organization may import into the country materials and fixtures required for the construction free from all duties and taxes and agrees not to utilize any portion of the international reserves of the Government. "
Article VIII of the above-mentioned agreement referred to the Host Agreement concluded on July 22, 1951 which granted the Organization exemption from all direct and indirect taxes.
In inviting bids for the construction of the building, the WHO informed the bidders that the building to be constructed belonged to an international organization with diplomatic status and thus exempt from the payment of all fees, licenses, and taxes, and that therefore their bids "must take this into account and should not include items for such taxes, licenses and other payments to Government agencies."
The construction contract was awarded to respondent John Gotamco & Sons, Inc. (Gotamco for short) on February 10, 1958 for the stipulated price of P370,000.00, but when the building was completed the price reached a total of P452,544.00.
Sometime in May 1958, the WHO received an opinion from the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue stating that "as the 3% contractor's tax is an indirect tax on the assets and income of the Organization, the gross receipts derived by contractors from their contracts with the WHO for the construction of its new building, are exempt from tax in accordance with . . . the Host Agreement." Subsequently, however, on June 3, 1958, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue reversed his opinion and stated that "as the 3% contractor's tax is not a direct nor an indirect tax on the WHO, but a tax that is primarily due from the contractor, the same is not covered by. . . the Host Agreement."
On January 2, 1960, the WHO issued a certification stating, inter alia,:
"When the request for bids for the construction of the World Health Organization office building was called for, contractors were informed that there would be no taxes or fees levied upon them for their work in connection with the construction of the building as this will be considered an indirect tax to the Organization caused by the increase of the contractor's bid in order to cover these taxes. This was upheld by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and it can be stated that the contractors submitted their bids in good faith with the exemption in mind.
The undersigned, therefore, certifies that the bid of John Gotamco & Sons, made under the condition stated above, should be exempted from any taxes in connection with the construction of the World Health Organization office building. "
On January 17, 1961, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent a letter of demand to Gotamco demanding payment of P16,970.40, representing the 3% contractor's tax plus surcharges on the gross receipts it received from the WHO in the construction of the latter's building.
Respondent Gotamco appealed the Commissioner's decision to the Court of Tax Appeals, which after trial rendered a decision, in favor of Gotamco and reversed the Commissioner's decision. The Court of Tax Appeal's decision is now before the court for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON respondent John Gotamco & Sons, Inc. should pay the 3% contractor's tax under Section 191 of the National Internal Revenue Code on the gross receipts it realized from the construction of the World Health Organization office building in Manila.
Ratio/Holding: No. Accordingly, finding no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Tax Appeals, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.
First: petitioner questions the entitlement of the WHO to tax exemption, contending that the Host Agreement is null and void, not having been ratified by the Philippine Senate as required by the Constitution.
We find no merit in this contention. While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate under the Constitution, less formal types of international agreements may be entered into by the Chief Executive and become binding without the concurrence of the legislative body. The Host Agreement comes within the latter category; it is a valid and binding international agreement even without the concurrence of the Philippine Senate. The privileges and immunities granted to the WHO under the Host Agreement have been recognized by this Court as legally binding on Philippine authorities.
Second: Petitioner maintains that even assuming that the Host Agreement granting tax exemption to the WHO is valid and enforceable, the 3% contractor's tax assessed on Gotamco is not an "indirect tax" within its purview. Petitioner's position is that the contractor's tax "is in the nature of an excise tax which is a charge imposed upon the performance of an act, the enjoyment of a privilege or the engaging in an occupation . . . It is a tax due primarily and directly on the contractor, not on the owner of the building. Since this tax has no bearing upon the WHO, it cannot be deemed an indirect taxation upon it."
"In context, direct taxes are those that are demanded from the very person who, it is intended or desired, should pay them; while indirect taxes are those that are demanded in the first instance from one person in the expectation and intention that he can shift the burden to someone else. (Pollock vs. Farmers, L & T Co.) The contractor's tax is of course payable by the contractor but in the last analysis it is the owner of the building that shoulders the burden of the tax because the same is shifted by the contractor to the owner as a matter of selfpreservation. Thus, it is an indirect tax. And it is an indirect tax on the WHO because, although it is payable by the petitioner, the latter can shift its burden on the WHO. In the last analysis it is the WHO that will pay the tax indirectly through the contractor and it certainly cannot be said that 'this tax has no bearing upon the World Health Organization.' "
Third: Petitioner claims that under the authority of the Philippine Acetylene Company versus Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al.,3 the 3% contractor's tax falls directly on Gotamco and cannot be shifted to the WHO.
The Court of Tax Appeals, however, held that the said case is not controlling in this case, since the Host Agreement specifically exempts the WHO from "indirect taxes." We agree. The Philippine Acetylene case involved a tax on sales of goods which under the law had to be paid by the manufacturer or producer; the fact that the manufacturer or producer might have added the amount of the tax to the price of the goods did not make the sales tax "a tax on the purchaser." The Court held that the sales tax must be paid by the manufacturer or producer even if the sale is made to tax-exempt entities like the National Power Corporation, an agency of the Philippine Government, and to the Voice of America, an agency of the United States Government.
The Host Agreement, in specifically exempting the WHO from "indirect taxes," contemplates taxes which, although not imposed upon or paid by the Organization directly, form part of the price paid or to be paid by it. This is made clear in Section 12 of the Host Agreement which provides:
"While the Organization will not, as a general rule, in the case of minor purchases, claim exemption from excise duties, and from taxes on the sale of movable and immovable property which form part of the price to be paid, nevertheless, when the Organization is making important purchases for official use of property on which such duties and taxes have been charged or are chargeable the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall make appropriate administrative arrangements for the remission or return of the amount of duty or tax "
Summary of Ratio: The certification issued by the WHO, dated January 20, 1960, sought exemption of the contractor, Gotamco, from any taxes in connection with the construction of the WHO office building. The 3% contractor's tax would be within this category and should be viewed as a form of an "indirect tax" on the Organization, as the payment thereof or its inclusion in the bid price would have meant an increase in the construction cost of the building.
USAFFE v. Treasurer of the Philippines (1959)
USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC. v TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET. AL. (June 30, 1959) Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
FACTS:
• Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950): RP Govt undertook to return to the US Govt in 10 annual installments, a total of about $35M advanced by the US to, but unexpended by, the Nat’l Defense Forces of the RP.
• Oct 1954: The Usaffe Veterans Associations Inc prayed in its complaint before the CFI that said Agreement be annulled; that payments thereunder be declared illegal; & that defendants as officers of RP be restrained from disbursing any funds in the Nat’l Treasury in pursuance of said Agreement.
• Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys available, instead of being remitted to the US, should be turned over to the Finance Service of the AFP for the payment of all pending claims of the veterans represented by plaintiff.
• 3 PROPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF IN COMPLAINT: 1) that the funds to be “returned” under the Agreement were funds appropriated by the US Congress for the RP Army, actually delivered to the RP Govt & actually owned by the said Government; 2) that U.S Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority to retake such funds from the RP Govt; 3) The RP Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the Agreement.
• The court eventually upheld the validity of the Agreement. Plaintiff appealed.
• July 26, 1941: Foreseeing the War in the Pacific, Pres Roosevelt, called into the service of the US Armed Forces, for the duration of the emergency, all organized mil forces of the Commonwealth. (His order was published here by Proc No 740 of Pres Quezon on Aug 10, 1941)
• October 1941: By 2 special orders, MacArthur, Commanding Gen of USAFFE, placed under his command all the RP Army units including Phil Constabulary.
• Thus, US Congress provided in its Appropriation Act of Dec 17, 1941 (Public Law No. 353): “For all expenses necessary for the mobilization, operation & maintenance of the RP Army, including expenses connected w/ calling into the service RP mil forces…$269,000.00; to remain available ‘til June 30, 1943, w/c shall be available for payment to the Commonwealth upon its written request, either in advance of or in reimbursement for all or any part of the estimated or actual costs, as authorized by the USAFFE Commanding Gen, of the necessary expenses for the purposes aforesaid.”
• Pursuant to the power reserved to him under Public Law 353, Roosevelt issued EO 9011: “2(a) Necessary expenditures from funds in the Phil Treasury for the purposes authorized by Public Law 353, will be made by disbursing officers of the RP Army on the approval of authority of the Commandign General, USAFFE, & such purposes as he may deem proper…”
• P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the AFP by means of vouchers w/c stated “Advance of Funds under Public Law 353 & EO 9011” This was used mostly to discharge in RP the monetary obligations assumed by the US as a result of the induction of the AFP into the US Army, & its operations beginning in 1941.
• There remained unexpended & uncommitted $35M in the possession of the AFP as of Dec 31, 1949. Bec the RP Govt then badly needed funds, Pres Quirino, through CB Gov Cuaderno, proposed to US officials the retention of the $35M as a loan, & for its repayment in 10 annual installments. This was the Romulo-Snyder Agreement, signed in Washington on Nov 6, 1950 by RP Foreign Affairs Sec Romulo, & US Sec of Treasury, John Snyder.
• PRESENT ACTION: Usaffe’s arguments – 1) the money delivered by the US to the AFP were straight payments for mil services; ownership thus vested in RP Govt upon delivery, & consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing to consider as a loan; 2) the Agreement was void bec there was no loan to be repaid & bec it was not binding on the RP Govt for lack of authority of the officers who concluded it.
ISSUES
• Basic issue: Validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement – Court can’t pass judgment
1. WON there is obligation to repay - YES
2. WON the officers who promised to repay had authority to bind this Govt – YES
RATIO:
1. YES
• Note that the $269M appropriated in Public Law 353 (see 8th bullet) expressly said that the money is to be handed to the RP Govt either in advance of or in reimbursement thereof.
• In any system of accounting, advances of funds for expenditures contemplate disbursements to be reported, & credited if approved, against such advances, the unexpended sums to be returned later. Congressional law itself required accounting “in the manner prescribed by US Pres - & said Pres in EO 9011, outlined the procedure whereby advanced funds shall be accounted for.
• It also requires as a condition sine qua non that all expenditures shall first be approved by the USAFFE Commanding Gen.
• These ideas of “funds advanced” to meet expenditures of the Phil Army as may be approved by the USAFFE Comm-Gen, in connection w/ the accounting requirement, evidently contradict appellant’s thesis that the moneys represented straight payments to RP Govt for its armed services, & passed into the absolute control of such Govt
• Instead of returning such amount into one lump sum, our Exec Dept arranged for its repayment in 10 annual installments. Prima facie such arrangement should raise no valid objection, given the obligation to return.
2. YES (They have authority to bind Govt even w/o Senate concurrence)
• There is no doubt Pres Quirino approved the negotiations. And he had the power to contract budgetary loans under RA 213, amending RA 16.
• The most impt argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of the Agreement by RP Senate to make it binding on the Govt.
• The ff explanation of the defendant was considered persuasive by the Court…
The agreement is not a ‘treaty’ as that term is used in CONSTI. However, a treaty is not the only form that an int’l agreement may assume. For the grant of treatymaking power to the Executive & the Senate does not exhaust the power of the govt over int’l relations.
Executive agreements may be entered into w/ other states & are effective even w/o concurrence of Senate.
In int’l law, there’s no difference bet’n treaties & executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained w/n their powers.
The distinction bet’n executive agreements & treaties is purely a const’l one & has not int’l legal significance.
Altman v. US: An int’l compact negotiated bet’n the reps of 2 sovereign nations & made in the name or behalf of the contracting parties & dealing w/ impt commercial rel’ns bet’n the 2 countries, is a treaty both internationally although as an executive agreement it is not technically a treaty requiring the advice & consent of the Senate
2 classes of Executive Agreements: 1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external relations & independent of or w/o legislative authorization, w/c may be termed as pres’l agreements; 2) agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Cong, w/c have been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements
The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these 2 classes for on Sept 18, 1946, RP Congress authorized the RP Pres to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness w/ the US.
Even granting there’s no leg authorization, the Agreement was legally & validly entered into to conform to the 2nd category, namely, as agreements entered into purely as executive acts w/o leg authorization’, w/c usu includes money agreements.
• The Agreement was not submitted to the US Senate either. But the Phil Senate’s Resolution No. 15 practically admits the validity & binding force of such Agreement.
• Further, the acts of Congress appropriating funds for the yearly installments necessary to comply w/ such Agreement constitute a ratification thereof, W/C PLACES THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY OUT OF THE COURT’S REACH, NO CONST’L PRINCIPLE HAVING BEEN INVOKED TO RESTRICT CONGRESS’ PLENARY POEWR TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS – LOAN OR NO LOAN.
HELD: Plaintiff failed to make a clear case for the relief demanded. Petition DENIED.
FACTS:
• Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950): RP Govt undertook to return to the US Govt in 10 annual installments, a total of about $35M advanced by the US to, but unexpended by, the Nat’l Defense Forces of the RP.
• Oct 1954: The Usaffe Veterans Associations Inc prayed in its complaint before the CFI that said Agreement be annulled; that payments thereunder be declared illegal; & that defendants as officers of RP be restrained from disbursing any funds in the Nat’l Treasury in pursuance of said Agreement.
• Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys available, instead of being remitted to the US, should be turned over to the Finance Service of the AFP for the payment of all pending claims of the veterans represented by plaintiff.
• 3 PROPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF IN COMPLAINT: 1) that the funds to be “returned” under the Agreement were funds appropriated by the US Congress for the RP Army, actually delivered to the RP Govt & actually owned by the said Government; 2) that U.S Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority to retake such funds from the RP Govt; 3) The RP Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the Agreement.
• The court eventually upheld the validity of the Agreement. Plaintiff appealed.
• July 26, 1941: Foreseeing the War in the Pacific, Pres Roosevelt, called into the service of the US Armed Forces, for the duration of the emergency, all organized mil forces of the Commonwealth. (His order was published here by Proc No 740 of Pres Quezon on Aug 10, 1941)
• October 1941: By 2 special orders, MacArthur, Commanding Gen of USAFFE, placed under his command all the RP Army units including Phil Constabulary.
• Thus, US Congress provided in its Appropriation Act of Dec 17, 1941 (Public Law No. 353): “For all expenses necessary for the mobilization, operation & maintenance of the RP Army, including expenses connected w/ calling into the service RP mil forces…$269,000.00; to remain available ‘til June 30, 1943, w/c shall be available for payment to the Commonwealth upon its written request, either in advance of or in reimbursement for all or any part of the estimated or actual costs, as authorized by the USAFFE Commanding Gen, of the necessary expenses for the purposes aforesaid.”
• Pursuant to the power reserved to him under Public Law 353, Roosevelt issued EO 9011: “2(a) Necessary expenditures from funds in the Phil Treasury for the purposes authorized by Public Law 353, will be made by disbursing officers of the RP Army on the approval of authority of the Commandign General, USAFFE, & such purposes as he may deem proper…”
• P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the AFP by means of vouchers w/c stated “Advance of Funds under Public Law 353 & EO 9011” This was used mostly to discharge in RP the monetary obligations assumed by the US as a result of the induction of the AFP into the US Army, & its operations beginning in 1941.
• There remained unexpended & uncommitted $35M in the possession of the AFP as of Dec 31, 1949. Bec the RP Govt then badly needed funds, Pres Quirino, through CB Gov Cuaderno, proposed to US officials the retention of the $35M as a loan, & for its repayment in 10 annual installments. This was the Romulo-Snyder Agreement, signed in Washington on Nov 6, 1950 by RP Foreign Affairs Sec Romulo, & US Sec of Treasury, John Snyder.
• PRESENT ACTION: Usaffe’s arguments – 1) the money delivered by the US to the AFP were straight payments for mil services; ownership thus vested in RP Govt upon delivery, & consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing to consider as a loan; 2) the Agreement was void bec there was no loan to be repaid & bec it was not binding on the RP Govt for lack of authority of the officers who concluded it.
ISSUES
• Basic issue: Validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement – Court can’t pass judgment
1. WON there is obligation to repay - YES
2. WON the officers who promised to repay had authority to bind this Govt – YES
RATIO:
1. YES
• Note that the $269M appropriated in Public Law 353 (see 8th bullet) expressly said that the money is to be handed to the RP Govt either in advance of or in reimbursement thereof.
• In any system of accounting, advances of funds for expenditures contemplate disbursements to be reported, & credited if approved, against such advances, the unexpended sums to be returned later. Congressional law itself required accounting “in the manner prescribed by US Pres - & said Pres in EO 9011, outlined the procedure whereby advanced funds shall be accounted for.
• It also requires as a condition sine qua non that all expenditures shall first be approved by the USAFFE Commanding Gen.
• These ideas of “funds advanced” to meet expenditures of the Phil Army as may be approved by the USAFFE Comm-Gen, in connection w/ the accounting requirement, evidently contradict appellant’s thesis that the moneys represented straight payments to RP Govt for its armed services, & passed into the absolute control of such Govt
• Instead of returning such amount into one lump sum, our Exec Dept arranged for its repayment in 10 annual installments. Prima facie such arrangement should raise no valid objection, given the obligation to return.
2. YES (They have authority to bind Govt even w/o Senate concurrence)
• There is no doubt Pres Quirino approved the negotiations. And he had the power to contract budgetary loans under RA 213, amending RA 16.
• The most impt argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of the Agreement by RP Senate to make it binding on the Govt.
• The ff explanation of the defendant was considered persuasive by the Court…
The agreement is not a ‘treaty’ as that term is used in CONSTI. However, a treaty is not the only form that an int’l agreement may assume. For the grant of treatymaking power to the Executive & the Senate does not exhaust the power of the govt over int’l relations.
Executive agreements may be entered into w/ other states & are effective even w/o concurrence of Senate.
In int’l law, there’s no difference bet’n treaties & executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained w/n their powers.
The distinction bet’n executive agreements & treaties is purely a const’l one & has not int’l legal significance.
Altman v. US: An int’l compact negotiated bet’n the reps of 2 sovereign nations & made in the name or behalf of the contracting parties & dealing w/ impt commercial rel’ns bet’n the 2 countries, is a treaty both internationally although as an executive agreement it is not technically a treaty requiring the advice & consent of the Senate
2 classes of Executive Agreements: 1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external relations & independent of or w/o legislative authorization, w/c may be termed as pres’l agreements; 2) agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Cong, w/c have been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements
The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these 2 classes for on Sept 18, 1946, RP Congress authorized the RP Pres to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness w/ the US.
Even granting there’s no leg authorization, the Agreement was legally & validly entered into to conform to the 2nd category, namely, as agreements entered into purely as executive acts w/o leg authorization’, w/c usu includes money agreements.
• The Agreement was not submitted to the US Senate either. But the Phil Senate’s Resolution No. 15 practically admits the validity & binding force of such Agreement.
• Further, the acts of Congress appropriating funds for the yearly installments necessary to comply w/ such Agreement constitute a ratification thereof, W/C PLACES THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY OUT OF THE COURT’S REACH, NO CONST’L PRINCIPLE HAVING BEEN INVOKED TO RESTRICT CONGRESS’ PLENARY POEWR TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS – LOAN OR NO LOAN.
HELD: Plaintiff failed to make a clear case for the relief demanded. Petition DENIED.
bayan v. exec. sec (zamora) 2000
Bayan vs Zamora
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000
Bayan vs Zamora
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
Source:
http://arielsag-execlass.blogspot.com/2008/09/bayan-vs-zamora.html
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000
Bayan vs Zamora
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
Source:
http://arielsag-execlass.blogspot.com/2008/09/bayan-vs-zamora.html
minucher v. CA 214 SCRA 242 (1992)
MINUCHER v. CA (September 24, 1992)
Petitioner: KHOSROW MINUCHER
Respondents: CA & ARTHUR W. CALZO, JR.
Nature: PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.
1. CALZO FRAMES UP MINUCHER FOR POSSESSION OF HEROIN. Calzo, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of Department of Justice of the USA ordered from Minucher, a labor attaché of the Iran Embassy in Manila Iranian were introduced by a common associate, Inigo. Calzo offered to help Minucher with his problem with his family’s US visas for a fee of $2,000. Calzo also found buyers of certain Iranian goods which Calzo was selling such as silk and carpets. So, Calzo came to the residence of Minucher and asked to be entrusted with a pair of Persian silk carpets with a floor price of $24,000 each, for which he had a buyer. The following day, Calzo returned to Minucher’s residence, took the carpets and gave the latter $24,000; after about an hour, Calzo returned, claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts at the American Embassy concerning the visas and asked for $2,000. He was given this amount. It turned out, however, that Calzo had prepared an elaborate plan to frame-up Minucher for alleged trafficking; both were falsely arrested by Calzo and some American and Filipino police officers, and were taken to Camp Crame in their underwear. Calzo and his companions took petitioner’s 3 suitcases containing various documents, his wallet containing money and the keys to his house and car, as well as the $24,000 which Calzo had earlier delivered to him. Minucher and his companion, Torabian were handcuffed together for 3 days and were not given food and water; they were asked to confess to the possession of heroin or else they would be jailed or even executed by Iranian terrorists. Consequently, the two were charged for the violation of Section 4 of RA. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the Pasig RTC. They were, however, acquitted by the said court. Calzo testified for the prosecution in the said case.
2. COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES. Minucher files a complaint for damages against Calzo and alleges that Calzo falsely testified against him in the criminal case. Minucher also avers that charges of unlawful arrest, robbery and estafa or swindling have already been filed against the Calzo. He therefore prays for actual and compensatory damages of not less than P480,000 ($24,000) representing the fair market value of the Persian silk carpet and $2,000 representing the refund of the amount he had given for the visas; moral damages in the amount of P5 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000 and attorney’s fees of at least P200,000 to answer for litigation expenses incurred for his defense in the criminal case and for the prosecution of the civil case,
3. SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO QUASH SUMMONS. Calzo’s counsel, the law firm LUNA, SISON AND MANAS, filed a Special Appearance and Motion alleging therein that since Calzo is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the USA, and the acts and omissions complained of were performed by him in the performance of official functions, the case is now under study by the Departments of State and Justice in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of determining what defenses would be appropriate; said counsel also prayed that the period to answer be extended. Then, counsel filed a Special Appearance to Quash Summons alleging therein that: The action being it personal action for damages arising from an alleged tort, the defendant being outside the Philippines and not being a resident of the Philippines, Defendant is beyond the processes of this court,” and praying that the summons issued be quashed. The trial court denied the motion in its Order. Unsatisfied with the said order, Calzo filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. In its Decision, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Calzo elevated the case to the SC but was dismissed due to non-compliance with par 2 of Circular No. 1-88 and its failure to show that the CA had committed any reversible error.
4. CALZO FILED HIS ANSWER. Thereafter, Calzo filed with the trial court his Answer in the civil case wherein he denies the material allegations in the complaint, sets forth the following Affirmative Defenses: “The Complaint fails to state a cause of action: in having Minucher and Torabian arrested and detained at Camp Crame; a quantity of heroin, seized from plaintiff by Philippine police authorities and in seizing the money used in the drug transaction, defendant acted in the discharge of his official duties or otherwise in the performance of his official functions as agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice and interposes a counterclaim for P100,000 to answer for attorney’s fees and the expenses of litigation.”
5. CALZO’S MTD BASED ON A DIPLOMATIC NOTE. Calzo filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground that as per the copy of Diplomatic Note No. 414 issued by the Embassy of the United States of America,13 dated 29 May 1990 and certified to be a true and faithful copy of the original by one Donald K. Woodward, Vice Consul of the United States of America on 11 June 1990, the Embassy advised the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines that:
“x x x Arthur W. Scalzo, was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on October 14, 1985 until his departure on August 10, 1988. x x x
x x x in May 1986, with the cooperation of Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, Mr. Scalzo investigated Mr. Khosrow Minucher, the plaintiff in the aforementioned case for allegedly trafficking in a prohibited drug. It is this investigation which has given rise to the plaintiff’s complaint. The Embassy takes note of the provisions of Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which provides that Mr. Scalzo retains immunity from civil suit for sets performed in the exercise of his functions, as is the caw here, even though he has departed (sic) the country.”
The trial court issued an order denying the motion for being “devoid of merit.”
6. CA DISMISSED CASE. Calzo then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA promulgated a Decision dismissing the case due to the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because the latter possessed diplomatic immunity. MR denied because: “When therefore Mr. Scalzo testified in the Criminal Case against Khosrow Minucher it was in connection with his official functions as an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States and member (sic) of the American Mission charged with cooperating with the Philippine law enforcement agency. He therefore, enjoys immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving State under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.” Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON a complaint for damages should be dismissed on the sole basis of a statement contained in a Diplomatic Note, belatedly issued after an answer to the said complaint had already been filed, that the defendant was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States Diplomatic Mission in the Philippines at the time the cause of action accrued?
HELD: NO.
7. CORRECT GROUND TO DISMISS: FAILURE TO STATE A COA. While the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss, the CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the civil case on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply-because of the Diplomatic Note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person. It may at once be stated that even if the Calzo enjoys diplomatic immunity, a dismissal of the case cannot be ordered on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person, but rather for lack of a cause of action because even if he committed the imputed act and could have been otherwise made liable therefor, his immunity would bar any suit against him in connection therewith and would prevent recovery of damages arising therefrom.
8. COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER CALZO. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired either by his voluntary appearance or by the service of summons upon him. While in the instant case, private respondent’s counsel filed, on 26 October 1988, a motion to quash summons because being outside the Philippines and being a non-resident alien, he is beyond the processes of the court, which was properly denied by the trial court, he had in effect already waived any defect in the service of the summons by earlier asking, on 2 occasions, for an extension of time to file an answer, and by ultimately filing an Answer with Counterclaim. There is no question that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the private respondent.
9. THE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED. The complaint for damages filed by the Minucher still cannot be peremptorily dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that the private respondent committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. As described in the complaint, he committed criminal acts for which he is also civilly liable. In the Special Appearance to Quash Summons earlier alluded to, an the other hand, private respondent maintains that the claim for damages arose “from an alleged tort.” Whether such claim arises from criminal acts or from tort, there can be no question that private respondent was sued in his personal capacity for acts committed outside his official functions duties. In the decision acquitting petitioner in the criminal case involving the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, copy of which is attached to his complaint for damages and which must be deemed as an integral part thereof, the trial court gave full credit to petitioner’s theory that he was a victim of a frame-up instigated by the private respondent. Thus, there is a prima facie showing in the complaint that indeed private respondent could be held personally liable for the acts committed beyond his official functions or duties.
10. REITERATED DOCTRINE IN SHAUF. In Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, after citing pertinent authorities, this Court ruled: “The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may haw mused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Dumlao vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 114 SCRA 247 [1982]).”
11. ARTICLE 31 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS admits of exceptions. It reads:
“I. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State, outside his official functions. (Emphasis supplied).
12. NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE HE ACTED IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY. There is of course the claim of private respondent that the act imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. In short, insofar as the records are concerned, Calzo did not come forward with evidence to prove that indeed, he had acted in his official capacity. It does not appear that an actual hearing on the motion to dismiss was conducted and that Calzo offered evidence in support thereof. Thus, it is apropos to quote what this Court stated in United States of America vs. Guinto:
“But even as we are, certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their official functions, we hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.”
It may be mentioned in this regard that Calzo himself, in his Pre-trial Brief, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity.
The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, such should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which the CA yielded to the private respondent’s claim is arbitrary.
DISPOSITION. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the CA is SET ASIDE and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila denying private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby REINSTATED.
Petitioner: KHOSROW MINUCHER
Respondents: CA & ARTHUR W. CALZO, JR.
Nature: PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.
1. CALZO FRAMES UP MINUCHER FOR POSSESSION OF HEROIN. Calzo, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of Department of Justice of the USA ordered from Minucher, a labor attaché of the Iran Embassy in Manila Iranian were introduced by a common associate, Inigo. Calzo offered to help Minucher with his problem with his family’s US visas for a fee of $2,000. Calzo also found buyers of certain Iranian goods which Calzo was selling such as silk and carpets. So, Calzo came to the residence of Minucher and asked to be entrusted with a pair of Persian silk carpets with a floor price of $24,000 each, for which he had a buyer. The following day, Calzo returned to Minucher’s residence, took the carpets and gave the latter $24,000; after about an hour, Calzo returned, claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts at the American Embassy concerning the visas and asked for $2,000. He was given this amount. It turned out, however, that Calzo had prepared an elaborate plan to frame-up Minucher for alleged trafficking; both were falsely arrested by Calzo and some American and Filipino police officers, and were taken to Camp Crame in their underwear. Calzo and his companions took petitioner’s 3 suitcases containing various documents, his wallet containing money and the keys to his house and car, as well as the $24,000 which Calzo had earlier delivered to him. Minucher and his companion, Torabian were handcuffed together for 3 days and were not given food and water; they were asked to confess to the possession of heroin or else they would be jailed or even executed by Iranian terrorists. Consequently, the two were charged for the violation of Section 4 of RA. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the Pasig RTC. They were, however, acquitted by the said court. Calzo testified for the prosecution in the said case.
2. COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES. Minucher files a complaint for damages against Calzo and alleges that Calzo falsely testified against him in the criminal case. Minucher also avers that charges of unlawful arrest, robbery and estafa or swindling have already been filed against the Calzo. He therefore prays for actual and compensatory damages of not less than P480,000 ($24,000) representing the fair market value of the Persian silk carpet and $2,000 representing the refund of the amount he had given for the visas; moral damages in the amount of P5 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000 and attorney’s fees of at least P200,000 to answer for litigation expenses incurred for his defense in the criminal case and for the prosecution of the civil case,
3. SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO QUASH SUMMONS. Calzo’s counsel, the law firm LUNA, SISON AND MANAS, filed a Special Appearance and Motion alleging therein that since Calzo is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the USA, and the acts and omissions complained of were performed by him in the performance of official functions, the case is now under study by the Departments of State and Justice in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of determining what defenses would be appropriate; said counsel also prayed that the period to answer be extended. Then, counsel filed a Special Appearance to Quash Summons alleging therein that: The action being it personal action for damages arising from an alleged tort, the defendant being outside the Philippines and not being a resident of the Philippines, Defendant is beyond the processes of this court,” and praying that the summons issued be quashed. The trial court denied the motion in its Order. Unsatisfied with the said order, Calzo filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. In its Decision, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Calzo elevated the case to the SC but was dismissed due to non-compliance with par 2 of Circular No. 1-88 and its failure to show that the CA had committed any reversible error.
4. CALZO FILED HIS ANSWER. Thereafter, Calzo filed with the trial court his Answer in the civil case wherein he denies the material allegations in the complaint, sets forth the following Affirmative Defenses: “The Complaint fails to state a cause of action: in having Minucher and Torabian arrested and detained at Camp Crame; a quantity of heroin, seized from plaintiff by Philippine police authorities and in seizing the money used in the drug transaction, defendant acted in the discharge of his official duties or otherwise in the performance of his official functions as agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice and interposes a counterclaim for P100,000 to answer for attorney’s fees and the expenses of litigation.”
5. CALZO’S MTD BASED ON A DIPLOMATIC NOTE. Calzo filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground that as per the copy of Diplomatic Note No. 414 issued by the Embassy of the United States of America,13 dated 29 May 1990 and certified to be a true and faithful copy of the original by one Donald K. Woodward, Vice Consul of the United States of America on 11 June 1990, the Embassy advised the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines that:
“x x x Arthur W. Scalzo, was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on October 14, 1985 until his departure on August 10, 1988. x x x
x x x in May 1986, with the cooperation of Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, Mr. Scalzo investigated Mr. Khosrow Minucher, the plaintiff in the aforementioned case for allegedly trafficking in a prohibited drug. It is this investigation which has given rise to the plaintiff’s complaint. The Embassy takes note of the provisions of Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which provides that Mr. Scalzo retains immunity from civil suit for sets performed in the exercise of his functions, as is the caw here, even though he has departed (sic) the country.”
The trial court issued an order denying the motion for being “devoid of merit.”
6. CA DISMISSED CASE. Calzo then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA promulgated a Decision dismissing the case due to the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because the latter possessed diplomatic immunity. MR denied because: “When therefore Mr. Scalzo testified in the Criminal Case against Khosrow Minucher it was in connection with his official functions as an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States and member (sic) of the American Mission charged with cooperating with the Philippine law enforcement agency. He therefore, enjoys immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving State under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.” Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON a complaint for damages should be dismissed on the sole basis of a statement contained in a Diplomatic Note, belatedly issued after an answer to the said complaint had already been filed, that the defendant was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States Diplomatic Mission in the Philippines at the time the cause of action accrued?
HELD: NO.
7. CORRECT GROUND TO DISMISS: FAILURE TO STATE A COA. While the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss, the CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the civil case on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply-because of the Diplomatic Note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person. It may at once be stated that even if the Calzo enjoys diplomatic immunity, a dismissal of the case cannot be ordered on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person, but rather for lack of a cause of action because even if he committed the imputed act and could have been otherwise made liable therefor, his immunity would bar any suit against him in connection therewith and would prevent recovery of damages arising therefrom.
8. COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER CALZO. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired either by his voluntary appearance or by the service of summons upon him. While in the instant case, private respondent’s counsel filed, on 26 October 1988, a motion to quash summons because being outside the Philippines and being a non-resident alien, he is beyond the processes of the court, which was properly denied by the trial court, he had in effect already waived any defect in the service of the summons by earlier asking, on 2 occasions, for an extension of time to file an answer, and by ultimately filing an Answer with Counterclaim. There is no question that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the private respondent.
9. THE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED. The complaint for damages filed by the Minucher still cannot be peremptorily dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that the private respondent committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. As described in the complaint, he committed criminal acts for which he is also civilly liable. In the Special Appearance to Quash Summons earlier alluded to, an the other hand, private respondent maintains that the claim for damages arose “from an alleged tort.” Whether such claim arises from criminal acts or from tort, there can be no question that private respondent was sued in his personal capacity for acts committed outside his official functions duties. In the decision acquitting petitioner in the criminal case involving the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, copy of which is attached to his complaint for damages and which must be deemed as an integral part thereof, the trial court gave full credit to petitioner’s theory that he was a victim of a frame-up instigated by the private respondent. Thus, there is a prima facie showing in the complaint that indeed private respondent could be held personally liable for the acts committed beyond his official functions or duties.
10. REITERATED DOCTRINE IN SHAUF. In Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, after citing pertinent authorities, this Court ruled: “The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may haw mused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Dumlao vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 114 SCRA 247 [1982]).”
11. ARTICLE 31 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS admits of exceptions. It reads:
“I. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State, outside his official functions. (Emphasis supplied).
12. NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE HE ACTED IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY. There is of course the claim of private respondent that the act imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. In short, insofar as the records are concerned, Calzo did not come forward with evidence to prove that indeed, he had acted in his official capacity. It does not appear that an actual hearing on the motion to dismiss was conducted and that Calzo offered evidence in support thereof. Thus, it is apropos to quote what this Court stated in United States of America vs. Guinto:
“But even as we are, certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their official functions, we hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.”
It may be mentioned in this regard that Calzo himself, in his Pre-trial Brief, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity.
The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, such should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which the CA yielded to the private respondent’s claim is arbitrary.
DISPOSITION. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the CA is SET ASIDE and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila denying private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby REINSTATED.
wylie v. rarang 209 SCRA 357 (1992)
WYLIE v. RARANG (28 May 1992)
Petitioners: M.H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams
Respondents: Aurora I. Rarang and the IAC
Nature: Petition for review
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
AT THE NAVAL BASE. In Feb. 1978, M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer and Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Aurora I. Rarang was employed as a merchandise control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal.
THE “POD”. Wylie, in his capacity as asst. admin. officer, supervised the publication of the Naval Base station’s “Plan of the Day” (POD), which featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of its regular features was the “action line inquiry.”
THE CAUSE OF THIS MESS. On Feb. 3, 1978, the POD published, under the “NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry,” the ff:
Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/ inspectress are (sic) consuming for their own benefit things they have confiscated from Base Personnel. The observation is even more aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to mention ‘Auring’ who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the head of the Merchandise Control Division is aware of this malpractice?
Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other personnel are prohibited from appropriating confiscated items for their own consumption or use. Two locked containers are installed at the Main Gate area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM evidence custodian controls access to these containers. Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their meals at their worksite due to heavy workload. Complaints regarding merchandise control guards procedure or actions may be made directly at the Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and necessary action….
Rarang was the “Auring” referred to here, as she was the only one with that name in the Office of the Provost Marshall, and Wylie’s letter of apology for the “inadvertent” publication was also conclusive proof of this.
AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES was instituted by Rarang against Wylie, Williams, and the US Naval Base. She prayed for P300K moral damages, exemplary damages, and P50K attorney’s fees.
RARANG’S ALLEGATIONS: the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulated in the English language and read by almost all the U.S. Naval Base personnel.
WYLIE, WILLIAMS, THE NAVAL BASE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS, BASED ON THESE GROUNDS:
1. Wylie and Williams acted in the performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are immune from suit;
2. The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued without its consent; and
3. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
MOTION DENIED.
THE TC’S DECISION: the acts of Wylie and Williams weren’t official acts of the US government in the operation and control of the Base but personal and tortious acts which are exceptions to the general rule that a sovereign country can’t be sued in the court of another country without its consent. Thus their acts weren’t imputable against the US government but were done in their individual and personal capacities. They were ordered to pay Rarang P100K moral and exemplary damages, and P30K attorney’s fees. However, the suit against the US Naval Base was dismissed.
BOTH PARTIES APPEALED. Wylie and Williams asserted that they are immune from suit since the publication was made in their official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy, and that they did not intentionally and maliciously cause the publication. Rarang appealed as she wasn’t satisfied with the award.
THE IAC MODIFIED THE TC’S DECISION: Rarang was awarded P175K moral damages and P60K exemplary damages.
WYLIE AND WILLIAMS’ ARGUMENT in this Petition for Review: they made the publication in the performance of their official functions as administrative assistant (Wylie) and commanding officer (Williams) of the US Navy and were, therefore, immune from suit for their official actions.
ISSUE: WON Wylie and Williams are liable for the published article in the POD. Does the grant of rights, power, and authority to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts?
HELD: YES and NO respectively.
THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, QUOTING US v. GUINTO: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2…Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation … As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that ‘there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends! (Kawanakoa v. Polybank) There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium . All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, ‘unduly vex the peace of nations.’ (Da Haber v. Queen of Portugal)
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded (Garcia v. Chief of Staff). In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called ‘the royal prerogative of dishonesty’ because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract it itself commences litigation…The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. (Rep. v. Purisima)… not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts (US v. Ruiz). As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. (Lim v. Brownell)
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, ALSO UNDER US v. GUINTO: In the case of the US, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty …
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon… to support their position that they are not suable, the US not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in Baer, the Court held:
“The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate… insofar as alien armed forces are concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners confined by American army authorities, Justice Hilado cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was explicitly declared: ‘It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.’ Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support excerpts from the works of the authoritative writers … Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provision should control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez … It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the ‘action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government.’ The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued: ‘It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter’s consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government’s consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.”
The above observations do not confer on the US a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied … In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
“The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii... The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.”
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the US. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the US, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the US itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS. The POD was published under the direction and authority of the commanding officer. The administrative assistant, among his other duties, is tasked to prepare and distribute the POD. The NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry is a regular feature of the POD , which was to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel should be brought to his attention for correction or investigation . According to Wylie, the action line naming “Auring” was received about 3 weeks prior to the article’s publication. It was forwarded to the Provost Marshal for comment, and the response “… included a short note stating that if the article was published, to remove the name.” This note was forwarded to the executive officer and to the commanding officer for approval. The approval of the commanding officer was forwarded to the office of the Administrative Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A clerk typist in the office of the Administrative Assistant prepared the smooth copy of the POD and Wylie, the administrative assistant signed the smooth copy of the POD but failed to notice the reference to “Auring” in the action line inquiry.
As the article implied that Rarang was consuming and appropriating confiscated items, she was investigated by her supervisor. Before the article came out, she had been the recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties.
PART OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. Wylie and Williams actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that US officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that they may not be held liable for the questioned publication.
BUT: TAKE NOTE THAT THEY WERE SUED IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. And our laws and, we presume, those of the US don’t allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty, and these aren’t covered by the immunity agreement.
CHAVEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN on the law on immunity from suit of public officials is applicable here: the general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith… A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. In the case of PCGG v. Peña, Chief Justice Teehankee added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Exec. Order No. I as follows:
…First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission, The cited section … provides the Commission’s members immunity from suit thus: ‘No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order.’ No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the State’s exercise of police power was immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office.
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith, or … ‘maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter’s constitutional rights and liberties’, there can be no question that a complaint for damages does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike.
ARGUMENT: that Williams as commanding officer is far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.
WHILE THIS IS TRUE AS A GEN. RULE, FOR THIS CASE NO. The records show that the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. Art. 2176 prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person’s act or omission constituting fault or negligence. “Fault” or “negligence” in this Article covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent. ” Moreover, Art. 2219(7) provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or exemplary damages .
ULTRA VIRES ACT CAN’T BE PART OF OFFICIAL DUTY. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD is a defamation against Rarang’s character and reputation. Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name if the article was published, but they were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name. Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed Rarang, and as a result she suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was baseless and false. Wylie and Williams alone, in their personal capacities, are liable for the damages they caused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the IAC are AFFIRMED.
Petitioners: M.H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams
Respondents: Aurora I. Rarang and the IAC
Nature: Petition for review
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
AT THE NAVAL BASE. In Feb. 1978, M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer and Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Aurora I. Rarang was employed as a merchandise control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal.
THE “POD”. Wylie, in his capacity as asst. admin. officer, supervised the publication of the Naval Base station’s “Plan of the Day” (POD), which featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of its regular features was the “action line inquiry.”
THE CAUSE OF THIS MESS. On Feb. 3, 1978, the POD published, under the “NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry,” the ff:
Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/ inspectress are (sic) consuming for their own benefit things they have confiscated from Base Personnel. The observation is even more aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to mention ‘Auring’ who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the head of the Merchandise Control Division is aware of this malpractice?
Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other personnel are prohibited from appropriating confiscated items for their own consumption or use. Two locked containers are installed at the Main Gate area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM evidence custodian controls access to these containers. Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their meals at their worksite due to heavy workload. Complaints regarding merchandise control guards procedure or actions may be made directly at the Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and necessary action….
Rarang was the “Auring” referred to here, as she was the only one with that name in the Office of the Provost Marshall, and Wylie’s letter of apology for the “inadvertent” publication was also conclusive proof of this.
AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES was instituted by Rarang against Wylie, Williams, and the US Naval Base. She prayed for P300K moral damages, exemplary damages, and P50K attorney’s fees.
RARANG’S ALLEGATIONS: the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulated in the English language and read by almost all the U.S. Naval Base personnel.
WYLIE, WILLIAMS, THE NAVAL BASE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS, BASED ON THESE GROUNDS:
1. Wylie and Williams acted in the performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are immune from suit;
2. The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued without its consent; and
3. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
MOTION DENIED.
THE TC’S DECISION: the acts of Wylie and Williams weren’t official acts of the US government in the operation and control of the Base but personal and tortious acts which are exceptions to the general rule that a sovereign country can’t be sued in the court of another country without its consent. Thus their acts weren’t imputable against the US government but were done in their individual and personal capacities. They were ordered to pay Rarang P100K moral and exemplary damages, and P30K attorney’s fees. However, the suit against the US Naval Base was dismissed.
BOTH PARTIES APPEALED. Wylie and Williams asserted that they are immune from suit since the publication was made in their official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy, and that they did not intentionally and maliciously cause the publication. Rarang appealed as she wasn’t satisfied with the award.
THE IAC MODIFIED THE TC’S DECISION: Rarang was awarded P175K moral damages and P60K exemplary damages.
WYLIE AND WILLIAMS’ ARGUMENT in this Petition for Review: they made the publication in the performance of their official functions as administrative assistant (Wylie) and commanding officer (Williams) of the US Navy and were, therefore, immune from suit for their official actions.
ISSUE: WON Wylie and Williams are liable for the published article in the POD. Does the grant of rights, power, and authority to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts?
HELD: YES and NO respectively.
THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, QUOTING US v. GUINTO: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2…Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation … As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that ‘there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends! (Kawanakoa v. Polybank) There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium . All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, ‘unduly vex the peace of nations.’ (Da Haber v. Queen of Portugal)
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded (Garcia v. Chief of Staff). In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called ‘the royal prerogative of dishonesty’ because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract it itself commences litigation…The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. (Rep. v. Purisima)… not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts (US v. Ruiz). As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. (Lim v. Brownell)
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, ALSO UNDER US v. GUINTO: In the case of the US, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty …
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon… to support their position that they are not suable, the US not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in Baer, the Court held:
“The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate… insofar as alien armed forces are concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners confined by American army authorities, Justice Hilado cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was explicitly declared: ‘It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.’ Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support excerpts from the works of the authoritative writers … Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provision should control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez … It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the ‘action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government.’ The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued: ‘It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter’s consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government’s consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.”
The above observations do not confer on the US a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied … In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
“The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii... The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.”
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the US. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the US, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the US itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS. The POD was published under the direction and authority of the commanding officer. The administrative assistant, among his other duties, is tasked to prepare and distribute the POD. The NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry is a regular feature of the POD , which was to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel should be brought to his attention for correction or investigation . According to Wylie, the action line naming “Auring” was received about 3 weeks prior to the article’s publication. It was forwarded to the Provost Marshal for comment, and the response “… included a short note stating that if the article was published, to remove the name.” This note was forwarded to the executive officer and to the commanding officer for approval. The approval of the commanding officer was forwarded to the office of the Administrative Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A clerk typist in the office of the Administrative Assistant prepared the smooth copy of the POD and Wylie, the administrative assistant signed the smooth copy of the POD but failed to notice the reference to “Auring” in the action line inquiry.
As the article implied that Rarang was consuming and appropriating confiscated items, she was investigated by her supervisor. Before the article came out, she had been the recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties.
PART OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. Wylie and Williams actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that US officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that they may not be held liable for the questioned publication.
BUT: TAKE NOTE THAT THEY WERE SUED IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. And our laws and, we presume, those of the US don’t allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty, and these aren’t covered by the immunity agreement.
CHAVEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN on the law on immunity from suit of public officials is applicable here: the general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith… A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. In the case of PCGG v. Peña, Chief Justice Teehankee added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Exec. Order No. I as follows:
…First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission, The cited section … provides the Commission’s members immunity from suit thus: ‘No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order.’ No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the State’s exercise of police power was immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office.
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith, or … ‘maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter’s constitutional rights and liberties’, there can be no question that a complaint for damages does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike.
ARGUMENT: that Williams as commanding officer is far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.
WHILE THIS IS TRUE AS A GEN. RULE, FOR THIS CASE NO. The records show that the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. Art. 2176 prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person’s act or omission constituting fault or negligence. “Fault” or “negligence” in this Article covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent. ” Moreover, Art. 2219(7) provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or exemplary damages .
ULTRA VIRES ACT CAN’T BE PART OF OFFICIAL DUTY. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD is a defamation against Rarang’s character and reputation. Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name if the article was published, but they were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name. Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed Rarang, and as a result she suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was baseless and false. Wylie and Williams alone, in their personal capacities, are liable for the damages they caused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the IAC are AFFIRMED.
Saturday, December 26, 2009
US v. Reyes 219 SCRA 192 (1993)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993
FACTS:
• Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. She’s married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco.
• Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager.
• Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradford’s instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards.
• Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting.
• Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken.
• Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k.
• May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.
• July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC.
• July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford’s act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority.
• RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision.
• Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction - YES
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction.
2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford’s motion to dismiss. - NO
Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC.
3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO
Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. It’s a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.
Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993
FACTS:
• Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. She’s married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco.
• Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager.
• Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradford’s instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards.
• Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting.
• Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken.
• Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k.
• May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.
• July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC.
• July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford’s act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority.
• RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision.
• Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction - YES
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction.
2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford’s motion to dismiss. - NO
Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC.
3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO
Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. It’s a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.
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